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I. INTRODUCTION
Twentieth-century American legal theory has been dominated
by utilitarian and economic approaches. As a result, scholarly
analyses of contract and tort law have focused on the public effects of
the resolution of private disputes. But in the last twenty years or so
justice has undergone a renaissance as so-called corrective-justice
theorists have tried to shift the discussion in private law back to the
relationships between individual parties. Tort law has been a
particularly fertile ground for corrective-justice theorists, and a lively
debate has developed about what the best corrective-justice account of
tort law would look like.
By contrast, comparatively little has been written about
corrective justice and contract law. In fact, Jules Coleman, one of the
most influential corrective-justice theorists, argues that contract law
is best explained by economic considerations that make bargaining
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easier and more reliable, whereas tort law requires corrective justice
because the bargaining costs are simply too high among tortfeasors
and victims.' Coleman is the exception: Most corrective-justice
theorists assume, or argue briefly in passing, that corrective justice
will apply equally well to contract law. 2 However, few attempts have
been made at anything like a comprehensive corrective-justice account
of contract. 3
This lacuna is surprising. While most major doctrines of
contract law are well entrenched and accepted, the theories meant to
explain those doctrines are not so well accepted, and many scholars
believe that there is no "generally recognized" theory of contract. 4
Economic and utilitarian analyses aside, twentieth-century theories of
contract generally fell into one of two broad categories. The first
claimed that what little distinct law of contract exists was simply
manufactured by Christopher Columbus Langdell and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, among others. 5 Contract law is a subset of tort law, according
to these theorists, and we should realize that and treat it as such.6
The courts were already doing so, it was claimed, leading these
theorists to talk of the "death of contract," and to speak hopefully of
the future when law schools would teach contract and torts together,
perhaps even calling them "contorts."7 In fact, Grant Gilmore was so
convinced that he began his 1974 book, The Death of Contract, with
the claim that not only was contract dead, but that "the point is hardly
worth arguing anymore," and proceeded to apologize for even writing
on such an uncontroversial subject.8 For death-of-contract theorists,
the fallacy of the Langdell-Holmes view lay in the link of contract to
promises.9 Contracts are binding, these theorists argued, not because
of promises, but rather because the promisee generally relies on the
promise to her detriment. 10 As Charles Fried, an opponent of the
1. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 197 (1992).
2. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 50-53. 136-40 (1995).
3. Peter Benson has made the most comprehensive attempt. See Peter Benson, Contract,
in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996)
[hereinafter Benson, Contract]; Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001) [hereinafter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law];
Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 515 (1992) [hereinafter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice].
4. Benson, Contract, supra note 3, at 24.
5. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 6 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1974).
6. For two of the most famous and comprehensive accounts of this kind, see generally P.S.
ATYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); GILMORE, supra note 5.
7. GILMORE, supra note 5, at 98.
8. Id. at 1.
9. Benson, Contract, supra note 3, at 29-30.
10. Id.
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contract-as-tort theories, put it, "My statement is like a pit I have dug
in the road, into which you fall. I have harmed you and should make
you whole."11 P. S. Atiyah went so far as to give a comprehensive
historical argument claiming that only the Victorian morality of the
nineteenth century had led to the focus on promising and to a
willingness of courts to enforce executory contracts.1 2
The other main category of contract theories, though often
referred to as "classical," was a response to the death-of-contract
theories.1 3 These "autonomy-based" theories tried to reestablish the
central position of the promise in contract law.14 Contracts are
binding, they argued, for reasons very similar to the reasons
promises-or at least promises of a certain sort-are binding.15
Following Kant, contemporary autonomy theorists like Charles Fried
argued that a promise is a paradigmatic case of a moral act and
constitutes the grounds for our status as moral agents and, indeed, as
humans.1 6 Thus, executory contracts should be enforced even without
reliance, since the basis for enforcing contracts in the first place is the
promise, irrespective of whether the nonbreaching party has relied on
it to his detriment.
Neither category of theories adequately explained contract law
as a whole. Contract remains alive and well today, and contract-as-
tort theories have never been able to explain why damages should be
measured by the nonbreaching party's expectation interest, the
standard contract remedy, rather than by her reliance interest, as the
tort view would suggest. Nor could they explain why wholly executory
contracts which the nonbreaching party had not relied upon should be
actionable, as they continue to be today.1 7 Although contract flourishes
as a distinct body, autonomy theories of contract have not provided
adequate explanatory accounts of its doctrine. While autonomy
theories did adequately explain the enforcement of executory
contracts, they provided a poor explanation for both the expectancy
measure of damages and for the doctrine of consideration.1 8 Since the
11. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 10
(1981).
12. ATIYAH, supra note 6.
13. Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 121.
14. For perhaps the most well-known example of the classical model, see FRIED, supra note
11, passim.
15. For historical background on the autonomy, or "will" theorists, as well as some standard
objections, see P. S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW 17-22 (1981).
16. FRIED, supra note 11, at 19-21.
17. See, e.g., id. at 21-27.
18. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 494-95, 511-16 (1989).
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enforcement of executory contracts, the expectancy measure of
damages, and the doctrine of consideration are all so deeply
entrenched in contract doctrine, a theory that fails to explain any one
of them must of necessity be considered incomplete.
The renewed interest in corrective-justice theory as a
noneconomic theory of tort law naturally leads to the question of
whether corrective justice might provide the unifying theory that is
lacking in contract law. This Note will explore that question in a small
way. Since little has been written about the role of corrective justice in
contract law, I shall begin in Part II by briefly discussing two of the
leading corrective-justice tort theorists, Jules Coleman and Ernest
Weinrib. After pointing out an important difference between Weinrib's
and Coleman's views, in Part III I shall turn to contract law and
briefly speculate about the prospects for a Weinribian account of
contract law. Drawing on the work of Weinrib and Peter Benson, I
shall argue that the relational features of private law highlighted by
corrective justice show great promise as possible explanations for
much of contract law. In particular, I shall focus on the question of
damages and, drawing again from Weinrib and Benson, argue that
despite Fuller and Purdue's famous assertion that by embracing the
expectation measure of damages, contract law leaves the realm of
corrective justice and enters that of distributive justice, expectation
damages when properly understood are, in fact, compensatory. I will
then enter new territory by arguing that one surprising consequence
of Weinrib's view is that under a corrective-justice account of contract
law punitive damages may be appropriate. That is, if corrective justice
does the best job of explaining and justifying contract law, minor
adjustments may still be necessary for the sake of coherence in
contract's underlying principles. If those underlying principles are the
corrective-justice principles advocated by Weinrib, I argue that we
should reconsider contract's per se ban on punitive damages. With the
conceptual possibility of punitive damages in place, in Part IV I shall
provide a positive argument for why punitive damages would be
warranted in some cases. This argument appeals to Kantian moral
theory, but in a way that differs from the usual appeals to Kant in
classical theories of contract. In Part V, I shall try to differentiate
between the kind of willful breaches that warrant punitive damages
and those that do not. To do so I examine the so-called tort of bad-faith
breach of contract, which is now good law only in insurance contexts,
and argue that the norms implicit in those contexts cohere well with
more general values in contract law as well as the specific Kantian
values for which I argue in Part IV.
[Vol. 56:237
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II. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE IN TORT LAW
This part begins, in Section A, with a brief discussion of
corrective-justice theory for the sake of background. In Section B, I
focus on a dispute between Coleman and Weinrib. That dispute is
important because it leads Weinrib to make a crucial distinction
between normative gains and losses and factual gains and losses, a
distinction that I discuss in Section C. The implications of that
distinction for a corrective-justice account of contract law are
discussed in Part III.
A. Corrective Justice: Broad Outlines
While it is not easy to find a single description of corrective
justice that all corrective-justice theorists will support, a few common
features can be identified. First and foremost, corrective justice seeks
to correct previous wrongdoings by examining the relationship
between wrongdoer and victim. This view of private law is most easily
distinguished from distributive justice. While distributive justice
concerns the distribution of wealth and other goods across the general
population, corrective justice operates on private relationships among
individuals. 19
To illustrate the difference between distributive and corrective
justice, Coleman proposes a thought experiment. 20 He asks that you
imagine yourself to be extremely wealthy, more so than the
Rockefellers, in fact, so wealthy that your wealth cannot be justified
by any principle of distributive justice. Imagine, on the other hand,
that Coleman is the opposite: so desperately poor despite his best
efforts that no theory of distributive justice would tolerate his poverty.
One day Coleman commits a tort that costs you money and results in a
gain for him. Since you are now somewhat less rich and he is now
slightly less poor, you are both closer to satisfying the demands of any
plausible theory of distributive justice. But our tort law would demand
that he reimburse your loss nonetheless. The reason, he claims, is
because tort law is not concerned with distributive justice, but rather
with corrective justice. Most corrective-justice theorists would agree
19. Even this statement may assume too much agreement among corrective-justice
theorists. For a broader discussion of the background of current corrective-justice theory, see Ken
Kress, Introduction to Formalism, Corrective Justice, and Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. i (1992).
20. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 304.
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with this simple intuition.21 Furthermore, for the same reason, they
would argue that tort law does not purport to satisfy some other
instrumental goals, like deterring certain behavior, spreading loss
over many members of society, or providing risk-of-loss insurance.
Such goals may be worthwhile, but they are more appropriately
pursued in the political realm than in individual private litigation
over whether a given actor is liable for a victim's damages.
Second, most corrective-justice theorists agree that the private
relations that corrective justice governs are in some sense bipolar.22 In
other words, while distributive justice is concerned with the justness
of one's holdings in relation to society at large, corrective justice
involves the correlative rights that we hold in relation to one
another.23 Tort law's methods of correction reflect this bipolarity:
Unjust gains and losses are not independent but coincidental changes in the value of the
parties' holdings. If the gains and losses were independent, the losses and gains could be
restored by two independent operations. However, because the plaintiff has lost what
the defendant has gained, a single liability links the particular person who gained to the
particular person who lost. 24
Thus, tort law does not pertain to individual losses that have nothing
to do with other people, as for example, when a hurricane destroys
uninsured property. Rather, tort law, and private law generally, is
concerned with losses that need to be corrected by others.25 When
someone drives her car carelessly and as a result strikes and injures a
pedestrian, justice demands that the driver repair that loss and make
the victim whole again, or at least as whole as monetary damages can
make her.
Finally, many corrective-justice theorists trace their roots to
Aristotle. 26 In fact, it was Aristotle who first paired private law with
corrective justice and contrasted this pairing with the pairing of public
21. As would most non-corrective-justice theorists as well. For an example of an argument
criticizing corrective-justice theories on these grounds, see generally Gregory C. Keating,
Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193 (2000).
22. Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 409-11 (1992). For a similar
view, but with a different conception of bipolarity, see COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 311-18.
23. See, e.g., Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice, supra note 3, at 536.
24. WEINRIB, supra note 22, at 409.
25. The precise way in which corrective justice is bipolar is a matter of some controversy
among corrective-justice theorists; this Note will explore part of that controversy. The basic idea
that corrective justice concerns relations that are correlative in some way, however, is
uncontroversial.
26. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 2, ch. 3; Weinrib, supra note 22, at 404-09; Benson, The
Basis of Corrective Justice, supra note 3, at 529-49; Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundation of
Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 452-56 (1992). But for a largely nonhistorical account, see
generally COLEMAN, supra note 1.
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law and distributive justice. 27 He also saw corrective justice as a
bipolar relationship between two individuals. 28 While justice is a
virtue, unlike other virtues, justice is directed towards another.29 The
most distinctive feature of Aristotle's account, however, is the fact that
he saw justice as a mathematical operation. 30 The pursuit of justice is
the pursuit of to ison, which in Greek means both "fairness" and
"equality."31 "In Aristotle's account, fairness as a norm is inseparable
from equality as a mathematical function."32 For him, corrective
justice and distributive justice are simply different mathematical
operations. 33 Particularly, corrective justice involved Aristotle's notion
of balance, or equipoise, between two individuals.34 Torts are
transactions that upset this balance and result in one person having
too much at the expense of another; corrective justice is about righting
the scales. 35 While the idea of seeing law as a form of mathematics is
jarring to us, and in the end Aristotle's account will be too simplistic
for our purposes, his basic intuition is still quite compelling and has
motivated many current thinkers.
B. Coleman's "Mixed Conception" of Corrective Justice Versus
Weinrib's Fully Relational Account
Coleman was one of the pioneers of the rebirth of corrective
justice in tort law. His early work in corrective justice centered on his
"annulment thesis," according to which the purpose of tort law was to
annul wrongful losses suffered by individuals. 36 He distinguished
corrective justice from distributive justice, according to which tort law
is a vehicle for preventing future losses, and saw the purpose of tort
law instead as being about making victims of wrongful losses whole
again.37 He was heavily criticized, however, by Ernest Weinrib and
27. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 120-23, 1131b25-1132b20 (Martin Ostwald trans.,
Macmillan Publ'g Co. 1962).
28. Id.
29. Aristotle's term is pros allon. See, e.g., id. at 114, 1129b25; WEINRIB, supra note 2, at
58-59; Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice, supra note 3, at 533.
30. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 57-63.
31. Id. at 58.
32. Id. It is important to note, however, that "equality" in this context does not suggest
distributive justice. It does not mean, for example, that justice demands that everyone have
equal holdings. Rather, it means that one does not have anything at the expense of another.
33. Id. at 57.
34. Id. at 62-63.
35. Id. at 61-63.
36. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND.
L.J. 349 (1992).
37. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 304-06.
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Stephen Perry, among others, for his failure to link the wrongdoer
with the wrongful loss, and thus for his inability to account for why we
make injurers pay for the victim's losses rather than holding society at
large responsible. 38 Under the annulment thesis, wrongdoers have no
more duty or reason to act to repair an injustice than anyone else
does. 39 In light of these criticisms, Coleman developed what he refers
to as a "mixed conception of corrective justice," in which he argues
that corrective justice also "imposes the duty to repair the wrongs that
one does." 40 According to this view, the wrongful loss is related to the
injurer because the injurer caused the loss. 4 1
Even after modifying his theory, Coleman still had his critics.
Perhaps the most prominent of them has been Ernest Weinrib. For
Weinrib, the causal connection between injurer and victim is not
strong enough for corrective justice. 42 Coleman's view focuses heavily
on the victim and on annulling the victim's wrongful loss. Weinrib
countered that under Coleman's view, wrongdoing by the injurer is not
necessary for tort liability;43 all that is required is that the loss be
wrongful and that it be caused by the injurer.44 A loss is wrongful for
Coleman if it involves a violation of an individual's rights.45 And for
Coleman such violations can sometimes be caused by justifiable
actions-in particular in what he calls "infringement" cases. 46 In such
cases, an injurer takes a morally justifiable action that in fact violates
the rights of another. The most famous example of such a case is
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. 47 Since the rights of another
were violated, the loss is wrongful; since the wrongful loss was caused
38. Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 381 (1992);
Ernest J. Weinrib, Non-Relational Relationships: A Note on Coleman's New Theory, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 445 (1992).
39. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 312.
40. Id. at 320.
41. Id.
42. Weinrib, supra note 38, passim.
43. Id. at 445.
44. Id. at 445-48.
45. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 335.
46. Id. at 344-49.
47. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). In Vincent, the crew of a steamship moored to a dock during
a violent storm decided not to cast off from the dock during the storm for fear of losing the vessel.
Id. The dock was destroyed by the steamship during the storm as the wind and waves pounded
the ship against it. Id. The dock's owners sued for the resulting damage to the dock, and the
court held the steamship owners liable. Id. However, the court went out of its way to stress that
the conduct by the steamship's owners was morally justified under the circumstances. Id. at 221-
22. "Theologians hold that a starving man may, without moral guilt, take what is necessary to
sustain life; but it could hardly be said that the obligation would not be upon such a person to
pay the value of the property so taken when he became able to do so." Id. at 222.
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by the injurer, the injurer is responsible, even though the injurer's
actions were morally justifiable.48
According to Weinrib, corrective justice requires not only a
wrongful loss but also wrongdoing on the part of the injurer.49
Coleman's "mixed conception," on the other hand, is open to certain
kinds of counterexamples. 50 For instance, in some cases the doctrine of
superseding cause will allow the injurer to not be held responsible for
the entirety of the loss. 51 For example, if a negligent driver strikes a
pedestrian, he will be liable for her injuries. But if the pedestrian is
taken to a hospital where she is subjected to gross negligence, the
injurer is generally not responsible for the further injuries even
though his actions caused them. 52 The additional injuries are wrongful
losses that were in a sense caused by the injurer (but for his striking
the pedestrian she would not have been in the hospital in the first
place), but the injurer is not responsible for the medical malpractice. 53
Therefore, Weinrib argues, wrongful loss (as defined by Coleman) plus
causation is not sufficient for tort liability. 54 According to Weinrib,
even under his mixed conception Coleman is merely shifting loss
around without an adequate account of why the injurer in particular
should bear the burden of that loss. What is required is a thicker
conception of the connection between injurer and victim. For Weinrib,
this thicker conception must be fully relational in the Aristotelian
sense where a bipolar relation exists between the wrongfulness of the
loss and the wrongdoing by the injurer.55
Weinrib's account is fully relational in another way that
Coleman's account is not. We saw above how for Aristotle corrective
justice involves two individuals who are linked because one has gained
at the expense of the other.5 6 As we shall see below, Weinrib preserves
48. Weinrib, on the other hand, agrees with the judgment in Vincent, but for different
reasons. Rather than calling the loss a wrongful loss that was not the result of wrongdoing,
Weinrib characterizes the transaction as a gain made by the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff that must be disgorged through restitution. See WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 196-203.
Therefore, according to Weinrib, Vincent is not best explained by tort law at all. Id.
49. Weinrib, supra note 38, at 445-48.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 447.
52. Weinrib is probably incorrect in referring to "wrongful medical treatment" as an
intervening cause. The injurer is generally liable for "all ordinary forms of professional
negligence." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 309
(5th ed. 1984). Weinrib's point still holds, however, for "highly unusual varieties of medical
misconduct." Id.
53. Id.
54. Weinrib, supra note 38, at 445-48.
55. Id. at 448.
56. See supra note 27.
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the idea that the injurer has gained something by injuring the
defendant. While Coleman once entertained this idea,57 he now claims
that "corrective justice has [nothing] at all to do with wrongful
gains."58 Thus Weinrib's view of corrective justice links the injurer to
the victim in two ways that Coleman's does not: it requires
wrongdoing instead of just wrongful loss, and it requires wrongful
gain on the part of the injurer.
Settling this dispute, or even giving a fully adequate
explanation of it, is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, I have
noted the dispute as a way of highlighting the nature of Weinrib's
fully relational view of corrective justice. Understanding the
motivation for his view is important, because the fully relational view
has certain surprising consequences if we try to apply corrective-
justice theory to contract law-as Weinrib, unlike Coleman, wants to
do. First it is important to examine more closely the specifics of
Weinrib's "fully relational" view.
C. Weinrib and the Distinction Between Normative and Factual Loss
For Aristotle, corrective justice concerns equipoise or balance
between the injurer and the victim. The ideal, easy case is where the
injurer gains by his unjust action the same amount that the victim
loses. For example, if someone steals a taxicab and converts it to her
use, then it makes sense for the law to force her to return not only the
cab, but also any profits she may have made from its use. Her
wrongful action has not only caused the owner a loss but has also
resulted in a gain for the wrongdoer. Corrective justice seeks to
restore the balance by taking from the wrongdoer what she unjustly
gained and making good the victim's loss.
This account as it stands is too simplistic to explain modern
tort law for the simple reason that very often wrongful losses by the
victim do not result in any gain to the injurer. If instead of converting
the taxi-cab the wrongdoer drives recklessly and crashes her own car
into it, the victim suffers a loss, but so does the wrongdoer. In such
cases, the measure of damages is generally determined just by the
amount it takes to make the victim whole, even if the wrongdoer is
also worse off for his behavior. Aristotelian mathematics does not
seem to explain such situations. It is therefore easy to see why
Coleman decided to abandon the idea of gain to the wrongdoer as a
57. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421,
424 (1982).
58. COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 369.
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critical feature of corrective justice. 59 Under his "mixed conception" of
corrective justice, Coleman still requires a violation of the victim's
rights by the injurer and therefore still stakes a claim to bipolarity for
his view, but he does not go so far as to require Aristotelian equipoise.
Ernest Weinrib addresses this difficulty in a different way by
drawing a distinction between factual gain or loss and normative gain
or loss. 60 Factual losses are those decreases in the amounts of one's
holdings-the diminution in monetary value of the car, for example,
and the owner's loss of profits. Normative losses, on the other hand,
derive from the justificatory structure of corrective justice. A person
suffers a normative loss when "there is justification for the law's
augmenting his or her holdings."61 Factual gain and normative gain
are similarly distinguished. Therefore, according to the correlativity of
corrective justice, even though a tortfeasor may not enjoy a factual
gain from negligently smashing another's car, she does achieve a
normative gain. It consists in "the excess in the defendant's holdings,
given the defendant's violation of the norm that the duty signifies."6 2
In short, we all have certain rights of noninterference. When a
tortfeasor violates the rights of a victim, the result is a normative gain
for the tortfeasor-he has taken more, on some normative measure,
than he is allowed to take-and a normative loss for the victim. We
impose liability to rectify both wrongs.
Weinrib's description of conduct violating norms of responsible
behavior as conferring a normative gain on the actor is controversial. 63
For present purposes, however, I will treat it as intelligible and
defensible. The point on which I wish to focus is whether it helps us to
understand measures of damages in private law. Typically the goal in
tort law is to compensate the victim for his losses. For Weinrib, that
means the injurer owes the victim the amount of her factual loss. 64
But once we distinguish normative loss from factual loss the way
Weinrib does, the question becomes: Why should the victim be
59. Id.
60. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 116.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 136.
63. For example, Weinrib's description of normative gain is arguably circular. What is more,
it is hard to imagine what a noncircular account of normative gain would be. George Fletcher
developed a Rawlsian account based on risk taking and used it to argue for a tort regime of strict
liability. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
Gregory Keating further developed Fletcher's account. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and
Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-18 (1996). But these theories have
their critics, too. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 70 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 61, on file with author).
64. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 135.
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compensated for her factual loss? If the basis for liability is normative
gain or loss, should not the goal be to make the victim normatively
whole again? And if that is our goal, how do we know that the proper
measure for what counts as being made normatively whole is factual
loss? Perhaps a sincere apology should be required, or a public beating
administered by the victim, or a sign worn by the tortfeasor that "I
violated the rights of John Doe." Of course, I do not mean to suggest
that any of these alternatives are better than the compensatory
damages scheme now in place. Rather, the point is that if we are to
take the distinction between factual loss and normative loss seriously,
then it is not at all obvious that rectifying one would rectify the
other.65
Even if we admit that rectifying factual losses by means of
monetary awards is somehow the key to rectifying normative gains
and losses, it is not clear that there would be a one-to-one mapping of
the one to the other. If tort law is about making victims whole again
and we take the distinction between normative and factual losses
seriously, then we have to ask whether we mean making them
factually whole again or normatively whole. Perhaps, for example,
some violations of rights are particularly vile, normatively speaking,
whether or not they result in much factual loss. Such an idea is almost
certainly behind the concept of dignitary harm. One argument for
allowing punitive or exemplary damages in tort law is to compensate
the victim for the amount by which her normative losses exceeded her
factual losses.
Weinrib himself rejects punitive damages as an appropriate
remedy even under tort law. 66 Liability for Weinrib is completely
determined by the injurer's violation of the victim's right and his
subsequent duty to restore the victim to her previous position (her
previous factual position). 67 Since we are merely trying to return the
victim to her previous position, only compensatory damages should be
allowed. 68 That is fine as far as it goes, but we should ask why the
distinction between factual and normative loss for which Weinrib
argued so strenuously in establishing the basis for liability should not
be transferred to the measure of liability as well. Presumably, when he
65. Both Coleman and Stephen Perry have made a related objection to Weinrib. "If I was
wrong in my earlier work to focus entirely on the wrongfulness of the loss as the point of
corrective justice, then I would commit a greater error by accepting the pure relational view that
treats the loss as only coincidentally connected to the duty to repair." COLEMAN, supra note 1, at
323-24; Perry, supra note 26 at 478-88.
66. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 135 n.25.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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speaks of making the victim whole, he means to make her factually
whole-i.e., reimburse her for her lost holdings. But perhaps we
should strive to make her normatively whole instead, or additionally.
Weinrib speaks as though the mere assignment of liability settles the
normative score "in a single bipolar operation."6 9 However, merely
holding the tortfeasor liable may not rectify the normative loss. If it
did, then there would be no reason to go further and award damages.
On the other hand, given that the tortfeasor does have a duty of repair
based on his commission of the tort, it is reasonable to conjecture that
in some cases his duty may go beyond merely compensating his victim
for her factual loss.
Exceeding factual loss does not necessitate conceptualizing this
increment as "punitive." With Weinrib's distinction in force,
recognizing a normative loss above and beyond the factual one and
ordering damages based on that additional loss is in some sense
compensatory, though not for the victim's out-of-pocket expenses and
her other factual losses. It would be compensation for more than just
losses in holdings, since we would be forcing an injurer to pay above
and beyond factual loss based solely on the degree of his own
misconduct (in Weinrib's terms, the amount of normative gain by him
and normative loss by the victim). The term "punitive" suggests a debt
owed to society and brings to mind attempts by courts to influence
future behavior of similar would-be injurers not party to the current
litigation. Thus conceived, it would be difficult to justify punitive
damages as a form of corrective justice, and Weinrib's rejection of
them is therefore understandable. But to the degree the term
"punitive"-or the older term "exemplary"-refers to attempts to make
one party right a wrong she has done to another party, a wrong which
may not be rectified by mere repair of factual loss, then such damages
are at home in a corrective-justice account like that provided by
Weinrib. Traditionally, punitive damages in tort law have been paid to
individuals, not to the government. Just as corrective justice is
distinguishable from distributive justice in that it involves relations
among individuals instead of the relationship between individuals and
society at large, the punitive damages in private law are
distinguishable from more conventional notions of punishment, since
they are owed to individuals rather than to society.
In a somewhat different context, Stephen Perry has raised a
similar objection to Weinrib's theory, v0 to which Weinrib has
69. Id. at 136.
70. See Perry, supra note 26, at 478-88.
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responded. 71 Perry argues that if anything, Weinrib's Kantian theory
of tort law establishes a "primary duty" not to injure others, but fails
to establish the "secondary" duty to repair injuries that one (even
wrongfully) causes. 72 Another way of putting the same point is that
what Weinrib establishes is that the wrong itself, the normative gain
and loss, is to be rectified, but he does not establish that the wrongful
loss, meaning the factual loss, is to be reversed: "Even if we suppose
that the notion of wrong which is said to derive from the normativity
inherent in agency carries with it some requirement that the wrong
itself be reversed or annulled, Weinrib nowhere demonstrates that any
loss which results from the wrongful conduct must also be reversed." 73
Perry then goes on to argue for the stronger claim that not only does
Weinrib not establish the secondary duty to repair, but that his theory
of agency in fact makes it impossible for him to do so.74
Perry's argument, grossly oversimplified, is that Weinrib's
Kantian theory of agency, which requires abstraction for the
particular factual circumstances at hand, cannot possibly bridge the
gap between the normative gain or loss and the factual gain or loss. 75
Weinrib's response, again grossly oversimplified, is that this objection
ignores the fact that the Kantian conception of agency requires not
only an abstraction from particular circumstances, but also an
actualization under particular conditions in order to be a case of
purposive, willful action. 76 The details of this debate are beyond the
scope of this project, especially since Weinrib handles Perry's stronger
objection quite nicely. What Weinrib does not do, however, is quite
relevant: He does not answer Perry's weaker objection. That is, while
he answers Perry's argument that Weinrib's Kantian theory of agency
can never bridge the gap between primary and secondary duties, he
does not answer the implicit weaker objection raised here. Weinrib
does not explain why the amount of factual loss exactly quantifies the
duty to repair normative loss.
By looking briefly at Weinrib's response to Perry, we can
imagine how he might go about answering this objection. Weinrib
claims that normative losses are tied to factual losses because in tort
law one generally infringes the rights of another by causing a factual
71. See WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 126-33.
72. See Perry, supra note 26, at 479.
73. Id. at 480 (emphasis in original).
74. "Not only does he not show us how to get from the primary duty to the secondary duty,
but the conception of normativity that he says is inherent in agency turns out to preclude that
very move." Id.
75. See id. at 481-88.
76. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 127-33.
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loss to the other.77 That is so because Kantian rights are based on
bodily integrity-whereby we are not to be treated as objects but
rather as free, purposive beings-and on the embodiment of our rights
in external objects of the will (things in which we have property
rights).78 Kantian rights deal with constraints on action.7 9 We judge
transactions to determine whether or not a constraint on action has
been violated. If it has, then the violator of that constraint has a duty
to "undo the consequences of the wrongful act by making good the
factual loss."8 Thus, Weinrib sees the duty to compensate as the
"natural remedial response to the infliction of wrongful loss."81
And so it is. That is why-or at least one reason why-private
law generally requires compensation rather than apologies,
imprisonment, or public humiliation. Any theory that did not at least
allow for this duty would be so at odds with our practices as to be
seriously flawed if it purported to be at all explanatory.
The fact still remains that tort law is not just about annulling
wrongful losses. As explained above, Weinrib himself has gone to great
pains (along with Perry) to impress this point upon Jules Coleman.8 2
Weinrib in particular wants to emphasize not only the wrongfulness of
the loss suffered by the victim, but also the wronging of the victim by
the injurer.8 3 Unless the distinction between normative and factual
loss is only a theoretical device for tenaciously clinging to an
Aristotelian conception of corrective justice as mathematical equality,
in some cases the two will not line up. And while it makes sense that
rectifying factual loss will usually suffice to rectify normative loss,
Weinrib has said nothing to establish that this must always be the
case. Particularly bad acts may require more than just an undoing of
factual loss or gain, since they may cause normative harm beyond the
amount of factual harm. At the very least, the conceptual possibility
remains open. Contrary to Weinrib's own conclusion, the awarding of
punitive damages in particularly egregious tort cases fits well into this
conceptual gap.
So far, I have discussed corrective justice in the context of tort
law, which is where most of the discussion of corrective justice in the
academic literature has taken place. I shall now turn to an
examination of how corrective justice might be applied to contract law,
77. Id. at 129.
78. See id. at 128.
79. Id. at 130.
80. Id. at 129.
81. Perry, supra note 26, at 480.
82. See supra Part I.C.
83. Weinrib, supra note 38, passim.
2003]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
where remedies are different from those of tort law because of contract
law's default rule of expectation damages and its per se ban on
punitive damages. Part III briefly looks at contract law through the
lens of corrective justice. When we do we shall see how undoing
normative losses will require more than merely undoing factual losses.
In fact, the standard remedy of expectation damages requires going
beyond factual loss to correct normative loss as a matter of course.
III. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND CONTRACT LAW
Most of the work currently being done in corrective-justice
theory lies in the realm of tort law. In fact, Jules Coleman, who, along
with Weinrib, currently dominates the corrective-justice literature,
simply surrenders all of contract law to economic theory s4 Weinrib
has, however, sketched the broad outlines of a possible corrective-
justice theory of contract law,8 5 and Peter Benson has also developed a
fairly thorough account.8 6 Through their efforts, we can begin to see
how a corrective-justice theory might offer an even more coherent
explanation of contract law than it does of tort law. Most obviously,
contract law lends itself to the principles of correlativity common to
corrective-justice theory even more than does tort law, since contracts
generally involve two or more parties who freely obligate themselves
to each other. Contract law seems especially well suited to a "fully
relational" view of corrective justice such as that of Weinrib.
First, one central doctrine of contract law maintains that there
is no enforceable contract unless there is both offer and acceptance.
This requirement of mutual assent suggests that contracting is
bipolar: action by both parties is required.8 7 An offer without an
acceptance is not enforceable, and vice versa. Without action by both
parties nothing changes; with the right kind of action by both parties
the rights and duties of both parties change. Transactions in tort law
are bipolar in that the rights and duties of both parties can change,
but generally the change is involuntary for at least one of the parties.
Contract law is bipolar in an additional way, in that the rights and
duties change only as a result of voluntary action by both parties. 88
84. See COLEMAN supra note 1, Part II.
85. See WEINRIB supra note 2, at 136-50.
86. See Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3.
87. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 137. For a much more detailed account, see Benson, The
Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 138-51.
88. Benson also points out that the same "logic of a transfer of ownership" is at work in gifts
of property, and gifts also must be accepted in order for a legally recognized transfer of
ownership to take place. Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 127-38.
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Second, contract law requires that promises be given in
exchange for valuable consideration in order to be enforceable. The
doctrine of consideration also reveals the bipolarity of contract law "by
affirming the promisee's participation in creating the right to the
promisor's performance."8 9 The doctrine of consideration helps to
ensure that the parties are treated as equals by requiring that parties
become bound only in exchange for something for which they bargain,
"thus participat[ing] as equal agents in the creation of the contract."90
Third, contract law demonstrates the bipolarity of corrective
justice in its treatment of unconscionable contracts. 91 Courts will
rarely enforce contracts deriving from the exploitation of a
vulnerability of one of the parties. 92 By protecting against agreements
obtained through exploitation, the law of contract treats bargaining
parties as equals and protects their rights as such. These fairness
constraints reflect the bipolar requirement of corrective justice that
the two bargaining parties stand in equal relation to one another.
The focus of this Note, however, is on damages, particularly
punitive damages. Before addressing punitive damages, it is necessary
to say a word about expectation damages. Despite the best efforts of
the contract-as-tort theorists, expectation damages remain the
standard remedy for breach of contract, and there is no indication that
this will soon change.93 Any adequate theory of contract must be able
to explain why this is so. As Benson observes, 94 for decades discussions
of contract law have generally begun by referring to Fuller and
Perdue's (really, Fuller's95) famous essay on contract damages. 96 In
that essay, Fuller criticized the expectation damages remedy,
claiming, among other things, that it went beyond the realm of
corrective justice into distributive justice.97 Therefore, anyone who
posits a corrective-justice account of contract law must explain not
only why expectation damages are the standard remedy, but also how
89. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 138, For a much more detailed account, see Benson, The
Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 151-63.
90. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 138.
91. Id. For a much more detailed account, see Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra
note 3, at 184-95.
92. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed. 1999).
93. Id. § 12.8.
94. Benson, Contract, supra note 3, at 25.
95. Fuller is "universally regarded as the main author of the article and, in particular, its
theoretical discussions." Id.
96. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936); L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).
97. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, supra note 96, at 56.
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expectation damages are a remedy in corrective justice. As it turns out,
Weinrib's theory can provide an answer to Fuller and explain
expectation damages. Like Weinrib's explanation of the Aristotelian
equipoise of tort law, it turns on the distinction between normative
and factual loss. This explanation comes at a cost, however, as it did in
tort law, by opening the door for punitive damages.
Fuller's argument that expectation damages are properly
considered as grounded in distributive and not corrective justice is
really quite simple. Corrective justice is concerned with compensating
a victim for the loss inflicted upon him by the wrongdoing of another.
In the case of breach of contract, a victim suffers a loss only to the
extent of the detriment caused by the promisor's breach. To that
extent, he should be compensated. But contract law goes further.
Rather than simply restoring the nonbreaching party to the place he
would have been had he never contracted with the breaching party,
contract law "no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo,
but to bring into being a new situation."98 It is unlikely that this
additional amount can be explained by reference to the value of the
nonbreaching party's psychological expectation. 99 Thus, according to
Fuller, contract law actually performs distributive justice rather than
merely restorative or corrective justice. The challenge for corrective-
justice theories of contract is to explain how it is that expectation
damages are really compensatory.
Peter Benson has offered a thoughtful response. According to
Benson, corrective justice is the justice of transactions, both voluntary
and involuntary. 100 Contract law effectuates a transfer of ownership.
To satisfy Fuller's demand and establish that the expectation damage
remedy is compensatory, it must be the case that "prior to the breach
and therefore before the time of performance, the promisee has an
entitlement to the thing promised, including its value, whether or not
the latter also figures as a reliance loss."101 This transfer takes place
not at the time of performance, but rather at the formation of the
contract.
To begin, it is clear where we must locate the source of this entitlement: It must be in
the contract itself, effected by contract formation. Contract formation, therefore, must
itself constitute a mode of acquisition; it must give the promisee the requisite
entitlement. More specifically, at and through formation, the promisee must acquire this
entitlement from the promisor with his or her consent. Unless this is so, the expectation
98. Id.
99. Id. at 57-58.
100. Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice, supra note 3, at 538.
101. Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 127.
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principle cannot qualify as a principle of compensation. Contract, then, must be
intelligible as a transfer of ownership from one party to the other.'0 2
Benson goes on to develop more fully the "logic of a transfer of
ownership" and to explain how this logic supports much of contract
law. 103 Expectation damages are compensatory, then, because they
merely give the nonbreaching party exactly what he already owned-
or at least the value of it.
The logical structure of this argument no doubt provides the
framework for an answer to Fuller. One feature of the argument,
however, is quite problematic: It seems strange, if not outright false,
to say that ownership is transferred at the time of contracting rather
than at the time of performance. Certainly the rights of possession
that normally accompany ownership are generally only transferred at
performance. For example, in the context of the sale of goods, "[t]he
essential element that determines the location of the risk of loss is the
identity of the party who has control over the goods.."104 Even
Blackstone, who saw contractual rights as a species of property rights,
distinguished rights of possession from rights to performance. 105
According to Blackstone, executory contracts create only a chose in
action and not a chose in possession. 10 6 It is only after a contract has
been performed that the buyer has a possessory right against the
world. What is more, the very idea that the promisee's right is a
property right at all is certainly debatable in the case of contracts for
services. 107
Benson does acknowledge that the rights a buyer gains at the
time of contracting but before performance are in personam rather
than in rem. 08 He argues that although the right that the promisee
102. Id. at 128.
103. Id. at 127-38.
104. U.C.C. § 2-509(4) (1991).
105. "As soon as the bargain is struck, the property of the goods is transferred to the vendee,
and that of the price to the vendor; but the vendee cannot take the goods, until he renders the
price agreed on. But if he tenders the money to the vendor, and he refuses it, the vendee may
seise [sic] the goods, or have an action against the vendor for detaining them." 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *448 (1766) (citations omitted). On the
other hand, according to Blackstone, once the buyer had performed, he incurred the risk of loss
even if the seller had not delivered the goods. Id. at *448-49.
106. Id. at *443.
107. I am grateful to Robert K. Rasmussen, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School, for this point.
108. "Moreover, in contrast to the so-called right in rem which is usually thought to result
from a present transfer, the right in contract is a right as against the other party only and to the
other's performance-a right in personam. It is only with actual performance that this personal
right against the other party becomes a real right against the world." Benson, The Unity of
Contract Law, supra note 3, at 132.
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has gained from the contract is against only the promisor rather than
against the whole world, it is still a possessory right, a right of
ownership. 10 9 If that were true, any transfer the promisor made to
anyone other than the promisee would not be legally enforceable
against the promisee, since it is axiomatic in the law that one cannot
transfer rights that one does not have. If Seller has entered into a
contract to sell his car to Buyer but instead sells it to someone else,
that third party gains a right to possess the car, and Buyer has only a
claim against Seller for damages. Although the transfer to the third
party subjects the promisor to a breach of contract claim by the
promisee, it is still a legitimate transfer to that third party, and the
law is not likely to deprive the third party of the property.
Weinrib's explanation for expectation damages is more
compelling. Rather than claiming that a contract instantly creates a
property right, Weinrib argues that a contract entitles each party to
the other's performance. 110 Weinrib does not elaborate on the point-
he only mentions it in a footnote-but it is important for his overall
view. Being entitled to performance is quite different from being
entitled to a particular piece of property. When Benson argues that
"the promised thing, including its value, must belong to the
promisee," ' he is trying to show that at the time of contracting the
promisee's belongings now include the thing promised, such that a
breach of that promise would be akin to taking away property the
promisee already owns. To put Benson's argument in Weinrib's
language, for Benson a breach of contract entails a factual loss.
But as Weinrib points out, the promisee gains an entitlement
to performance, not to the thing itself.11 2 Such an entitlement is less
tangible than an entitlement to a thing. Although Weinrib does not
discuss the issue, the entitlement to performance is best understood as
a normative entitlement, and the subsequent loss when the promisor
fails to perform is a normative loss rather than a factual loss in
holdings. Of course, the promisee may suffer a factual loss if, for
example, she incurs expenditures in reliance on the promise. But
contract law usually measures damages by her expectancy, not by her
reliance. It would make more sense to call the loss a factual loss if, as
Benson would have it, contracting actually transferred ownership
109. Id. at 135-36. Interestingly, Benson notes that "[i]n reaching this conclusion, I am
departing from Kant's view. According to Kant, what the promisee acquires at formation is just
the promise of performance. The promise is the substance of the promisee's personal right as
against the promisor." Id. at 136 n.26.
110. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 136 n.26.
111. Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, supra note 3, at 127.
112. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 136.
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prior to performance. But in fact, the promisee does not really gain
ownership until performance; before performance, the promisee
merely has a right to performance. This right will sometimes be
assignable and thus may have a monetary value. 113 But the important
point is that for Weinrib the contract itself does not change the
promisor's position with respect to the thing promised, but rather
"works a voluntarily assumed correlative change in [the] moral
position" of the parties. 1 4
Although Weinrib's view relies on the controversial distinction
between normative and factual loss, if the distinction is valid his
account is superior to Benson's explanation. Benson's account has the
necessary logic to explain how, contra Fuller, expectation damages are
compensatory and not distributive, but it relies on the strong and
controversial premise that ownership is transferred at the time of
contracting rather than at the time of performance. Weinrib's
distinction between normative and factual losses avoids such a claim
while maintaining the logic necessary for expectation damages to be
compensatory. They are compensatory, but not because the promisee
suffers a factual loss. In fact, aside from possible reliance, the
promisee generally does not suffer a factual loss from the promisor's
nonperformance since the promisee only really comes to ownership
when the contract is performed. 115 But while the promisee does not yet
have rights in the thing itself, such that the lack of performance would
result in a factual loss, the promisee does have a right to performance:
she has a normative claim against the promisor. Therefore, when the
promisor fails to perform, even if the promisee suffers no factual loss,
she does suffer a normative one in that "there is a justification for the
law's augmenting ... her holdings."11 6
We saw in Part II how Weinrib introduced the distinction
between factual and normative loss to account for the fact that the
injurer in tort cases is seldom any better off for having injured the
113. Blackstone also saw contractual rights as a form of property rights, choses in action. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 105, at *443. The fact that contractual rights are often assignable and
therefore look in many ways like other property rights might lead one to conclude that a breach
of contract results in factual loss. But this would be a mistake since the right to performance is
not actually lost the way the value of one's car is lost in an accident. Therefore, even if someone's
chose in action is part of her holdings, the breach of contract itself does not constitute a loss of
those holdings. The loss, if any, is a normative loss.
114. WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 137.
115. Of course, reliance damages will sometimes be substantial, especially when they include
lost opportunity costs. Indeed, Fuller speculated that expectation damages might be in part an
attempt to compensate for lost opportunity costs, which are usually very speculative and difficult
to calculate. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, supra note 96, at 60-
61.
116. Id. at 116.
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victim. We also saw that although Weinrib is opposed to punitive
damages in tort, his opposition may run afoul of his idea of normative
gains and losses as providing the basis for tort liability. Now I have
argued that the distinction between normative and factual loss would
also be at the heart of a Weinribian account of contract law, as it is
necessary to explain how it is that the expectancy measure of damages
is compensatory. Expectation damages reflect the amount of
normative loss suffered by the promisee even when the promisee has
suffered little or no factual loss.
But while this distinction works well in that it allows Weinrib
to have expectation damages be compensatory without forcing him to
embrace Benson's more suspect claims regarding the transfer of
ownership at the time of contracting, it again may have consequences
he would not intend. As with tort law, the sort of reparation that the
victim's normative loss will require is an open question. In tort law,
Weinrib equated the damage remedy with factual loss. I argued that
this equation may be premature and that in at least some
circumstances the normative loss may be great enough that mere
compensation for factual loss will not suffice. Now we see that in
contract law it is, in fact, normally the case that mere compensation
for factual loss will not suffice. The question naturally arises, then,
whether contract damages will always be capped by the nonbreaching
party's expectation interest, as current American law requires, 117 or
whether punitive damages would sometimes be justified as a way of
compensating for particularly great normative losses. Although a
breach of contract will not usually result in a huge normative loss, it
appears to be a consequence of Weinrib's view that particularly
egregious cases could call for punitive damages.
In Part II, we saw that Stephen Perry's objection that Weinrib
does not and in fact cannot derive a secondary duty to repair factual
loss from a primary duty not to cause normative loss.1"" Perry's
objection was based on the abstract nature of the Kantian rights and
duties that, according to Weinrib, form the basis of tort liability.
Weinrib responded that, notwithstanding the abstract nature of
Kantian rights and duties, particular rights and duties are still
grounded in particular, contingent circumstances. The duty to
compensate for factual loss arises from the fact that the holdings that
are lost in a wrongful injury are embodiments of the victim's rights.
Undoing that loss is therefore the natural way to undo the normative
loss the victim suffers when his rights are infringed. Just as
117. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 12.8.
118. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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normative and factual losses are inflicted by one action, so are they
corrected by one action, the restoration of the victim's holdings.
I argued that while Weinrib's claim for tort law does seem to
answer Perry's stronger objection (that the idea of normative loss
cannot be used to impose a duty to repair factual loss at all), it fails to
answer his weaker objection. Perry had objected that Weinrib had
failed to demonstrate that restoring factual loss will always exactly
repair normative loss. Weinrib's claim, I argued, is (like Coleman's
annulment thesis) too focused on the wrongful (factual) loss of the
victim while not fully accounting for the wrongdoing of the injurer. In
particular, it ignores the possibility that in rare cases the wrongdoing
by the injurer can be so egregious that it causes normative losses that
the mere restoration of factual losses will not rectify.
Since the remedy for a breach of contract usually awards
damages based on normative loss in excess of factual loss, Weinrib's
response to Perry will work even less well for contract law than it does
for tort law. According to that response, the measure of damages for
breach of contract should be based on the promisee's reliance since
that would be sufficient to restore the victim's factual holdings. 119
Expectation damages, on the other hand, go beyond correcting
infringements in the physical embodiments of the promisee's rights. In
many cases the promisee will not have suffered a loss in holdings at
all, yet she is still entitled to expectation damages. The best
explanation for this rule-at least, the best Weinribian explanation-
is that when a promise is breached the promisee incurs a normative
loss that normally cannot be corrected by simply restoring her loss in
holdings. Thus, what was a mere conceptual possibility in Weinrib's
theory of tort is the standard practice in contract law.
Some normative losses can be so great that even expectation
damages will not suffice. Just as particularly egregious malfeasance
may justify punitive damages in tort law, it now seems quite possible
that egregious, bad-faith breaches may justify punitive damages in
contract law as well. It seems that we need a more inclusive
conception of the secondary duties of reparation than the one Weinrib
suggests. Perhaps, in true Weinribian fashion, we can further specify
such a duty by appealing to Kantian moral theory.
119. As we saw, that is exactly what Lon Fuller (though not a corrective-justice theorist
himself) argued that contract law ought to do.
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IV. CONTRACTS, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, AND THE CATEGORICAL
IMPERATIVE
Contemporary corrective-justice theories, Weinrib's in
particular, are often understood in terms of Kant's moral philosophy.
Our duty to exercise due care not to harm others is based on a duty to
respect them as persons. We have a duty to exercise our own will in
such a way that it does not interfere with the corresponding right of
others to exercise their free will. Our own rights to act freely and to
pursue our own conception of the good extend to, but do not cross, the
boundaries of others' abilities to do the same. When we take excessive
risks we fail to respect those rights of others. According to one
formulation of Kant's famous categorical imperative, we are never to
treat people as mere means to an end, but instead should always see
them as ends in themselves. And according to many corrective-justice
theories of tort, when we take excessive risks and thereby fail to
respect the rights of others, we are treating them as objects rather
than as rational agents. Of course, this is a gross oversimplification of
both Kant's moral philosophy and corrective-justice theories, but it
should suffice for the limited point I wish to make.
While Kantian moral theory has often been cited in contract
theory, it has generally been used as an explanation for why promises
ought to be binding. Autonomy theorists like Charles Fried have made
much of Kant's emphasis on promising as an example of the will
binding itself, and of lying or the breaking of promises as an example
of a violation of Kant's categorical imperative. 120 But their focus has
been almost entirely on the promisor against whom the contract is to
be enforced. A corrective-justice account, by contrast, does not allow us
to focus only on the promisor. Instead, corrective justice emphasizes
the fact that private law governs relationships among individuals and
focuses on the correlativity of rights and duties. Thus, a corrective-
justice theory of contract law would have to account not only for the
act of the promisor in making the promise, but also for the role of the
promisee.
If we combine a conception of contract law underwritten by the
categorical imperative not to treat others merely as means to an end
with the Weinribian idea of normative gain and loss, then we have
occasion to reconsider the damage remedies available for willful, bad-
faith breaches. Given that contracting involves the kind of exercise of
free will that is distinctively human-that is only available to rational
agents and that distinguishes us from mere objects-when we take on
120. ATIYAH, supra note 15, at 17-22.
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contractual obligations, we are doing something that only rational
agents can do. By agreeing to obligate ourselves in exchange for
something else, we take risks: we risk not being able to perform and
having to pay damages, we risk that the other side may be unable or
unwilling to perform and perhaps unable even to pay damages should
it not perform, and we risk that even if both sides perform, the
benefits may not be as great as we had hoped. On the other hand,
since contracting allows us to make claims on the other party that we
would not otherwise be able to make, we benefit by the other party
obligating itself and taking similar risks.
When we undertake such obligations, however, we also expose
ourselves to various forms of predatory or opportunistic behavior.
Unscrupulous people will be able to use the practice of contracting to
take liberties with others that would otherwise be unavailable. In the
contract formation process, one party might deceive or exploit the
other. Once both parties are bound by a contract, one party may
decide to completely disregard the contractual obligation and instead
simply opt to pay damages, even when he knows that the other party
bargained for performance and that expectation damages will be
unsatisfying. Taking advantage of the other party in this way would
be particularly offensive under a Kantian theory of corrective justice
where the only reason the nonbreaching party would be vulnerable to
such bad-faith behavior would be because she had freely entered into
the contract. Given that we are to respect people as free, autonomous
agents and not treat them as mere things, taking advantage of
someone's agency in this way is particularly reprehensible. The
normative gain and loss associated with such an exploitative
transaction would exceed the terms of the contract and the
expectation damages remedy.
To put the point another way, the world is made up of agents
with free will and external objects without free will. In a typical tort
case, an injurer comes to owe a victim money by damaging her
physical property. Although this loss is merely a factual loss, it also is
a normative loss because the physical property is the embodiment of
the victim's agency. 121 By violating another's right to bodily integrity
or property ownership, we treat that person as an object rather than
as an agent with free will.122 But in contract law the tie to Kantian
moral theory is even closer, since instead of infringing on mere
embodiments of another's free will, an actor who willfully and in bad
121. "[A]gents are barred from interfering with things-the bodies and properties of other
agents-that are the embodiments of someone else's free will." WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 129.
122. "For by such a breach one actor treats another not as a self-determining being but as
the instrument of an extrinsic purpose." Id. at 128.
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faith breaches a contract does so by means of another's free will. To do
so is not only to fail to respect another's status as a moral agent, but is
also to take advantage of that status and to use that very status to
treat him as an object.
It might be objected that the argument thus far proves too
much, for it seems to imply that punitive damages would be
appropriate for any breach of contract, or at least for any willful
breach. On the other hand, one might object that even willful breaches
will never warrant punitive damages because parties enter into
contracts knowing that breach by the other side is a distinct
possibility. Holmes famously argued that when we enter into
contracts, we are really promising either to perform or to pay
damages. 123 If that is true, then it is difficult to see breach of contract
as the kind of wrong that would warrant punitive damages. 124
These two objections are best answered in conjunction.
Holmes's thesis could mean two different things. On the one hand, in
keeping with his separation of law and morality, it could just be an
assertion of what constitutes legal obligations. According to this view,
we simply think of law as "the bad man" would. 125 Just as the bad man
is unencumbered by any moral compunction to keep promises, so too
the law will not require him to keep them (although it will require him
to pay damages if he does not). Whatever merits this view may have
as an interpretation of what Holmes intended, it is inconsistent with
any application of corrective justice. Corrective justice does not allow
us just to think of law as the bad man would. Whether corrective
justice is right to reject this strict separation of law and morality is
beyond the scope of this project.
A more charitable interpretation of the Holmesian thesis, at
least from the standpoint of corrective justice, is that it shows that
while parties do undertake moral obligations by contracting, the
obligations they undertake are not necessarily exactly as stated in the
contract. Rather, the content of the promise is a covenant to either
perform or pay damages. According to this view, the promisor does
have an obligation under the contract in the thickly normative sense,
but he fulfills that obligation either by performing or by breaching and
paying expectation damages.
123. "[T]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
124. In fact, in some types of contracts, like futures contracts, breach is expected. Again, I am
grateful to Professor Robert Rasmussen for this point.
125. Holmes, supra note 123, at 459.
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Even this more limited Holmesian thesis is quite
controversial. 126 It is not at all clear that parties who promise to
perform really intend just to perform or to pay damages. And if they
do have some sort of Holmesian promise in mind, it is even less clear
exactly what that promise would be. Does a promise to perform mean
that the promisor may for any reason choose to pay damages instead
of performing? Or does a promise to perform mean he must do so
unless a labor strike or a natural disaster occurs, or unless business
goes bad, etc., in which case paying expectation damages would
suffice? The latter kind of promise would more accurately capture the
typical promisor's state of mind. But even in that case it would be
necessary to determine which factors were included in the "unless"
clause-a difficult, if not impossible, task.' 27
These difficulties aside, the Holmesian thesis certainly has had
an impact on American contract law. If nothing else, sophisticated
promisees should by now be on notice that in general promisors can
breach freely and willfully as long as they pay expectation damages.
Since promisees are now on notice, promises can fairly be interpreted
as weaker, Holmesian obligations to either perform or pay damages.
Therefore, a breach of contract will not usually warrant punitive
damages because the payment of expectation damages will fulfill the
normative requirements of the contractual obligation.
In some situations, however, it would be inappropriate to
attribute the Holmesian promise to the promisor. Unsophisticated
parties, for example, may be unaware of the way courts have accepted
the Holmesian thesis. To some parties, performance itself will be
important, perhaps for fear that damage remedies will be insufficient.
Sophisticated parties typically will contract around this difficulty with
liquidated damage clauses, but unsophisticated parties may not know
to do that, especially when they do not have legal counsel present at
the time of contracting. Instead, they may seek and rely on assurances
from the promisor that it will indeed perform. When it is clear to a
126. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 18, at 512-13.
127. On the other hand, an appeal to such "unless" clauses might allow a corrective-justice
account of contract law to address worries about the performance of inefficient contracts.
Economic theorists argue against punitive damages in contract law on the ground that they
would discourage efficient breaches and encourage parties to perform even when performance is
wasteful. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 131 (5th ed., Aspen Law &
Bus. 1998) (1973). Efficiency arguments have won over much of the current legal scholarship as
an explanation for why punitive damages are not awarded in contract cases. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory cmt. to ch. 16 at 100 (1981); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 92, § 12.3. While a direct appeal to efficiency would be out of place in a corrective-
justice account of contract law, to the degree that the content of a promisor's promise is
something like a promise to perform unless performance would be wasteful, corrective-justice
theory will not necessarily encourage wasteful performance.
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promisor at the time of contracting that a promisee, whom the
promisor knows to be unsophisticated, really desires performance and
is likely to be greatly disappointed with expectation damages, it would
be unjust for that promisor later to claim to have made only a
Holmesian promise.
Consider, for example, the Peevyhouse case. 128 In that case, the
Peevyhouses leased sixty acres of their 120-acre farm to the defendant
coal company for five years so that the coal company could conduct
strip-mining on it.129 The lease provided that at the conclusion of the
mining operations, the coal company would fill in all the pits and
smooth the surface. 130 The defendant did nothing to repair the land,
and expert testimony at trial estimated that while the cost of such
repairs would be around $29,000, the increase in the value of the land
due to the repairs would be no more than $300.131 Although the jury
awarded a verdict of $5,000 to the Peevyhouses, 32 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, reduced the verdict to $300
on the ground that $5,000 was more than the value of the land had
the remedial work been done.1 33 A dissent, however, pointed out that
all the costs and benefits in the defendant's performance could have
been foreseen at the time of contracting, and that by the defendant's
own admission, the Peevyhouses had insisted on the remedial
provision and had indicated that without it they would not have
signed the lease. 134
If any contract case cries out for punitive damages, the
Peevyhouse case does. It is difficult to look at the facts of this case
without concluding that the coal company simply breached because
they could and because they had reason to believe that they would
only pay $300 by breaching even though they had assured the
Peevyhouses they would actually perform the work. What seems
particularly troublesome about the case is that the coal company was
able to use the Peevyhouses' ability to contract against them. If the
coal company had merely taken the coal without a contract, then they
would have been subject to actions for trespass and conversion and
would have been forced to pay for the entire value of the coal, pay for
128. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962); see also Maute,
Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. Revisited: The Ballad of Willie and Lucille, 89 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1341 (1995).
129. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 111, 117.
130. Id. at 111, 114.
131. Id. at 111.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 114.
134. Id. at 115.
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damage to the land, and be subjected to punitive damages, at least if a
jury was inclined to award them. It was only because the Peevyhouses
freely entered into the contract that the coal company was able to take
the coal without trespassing. Its willful breach took advantage of the
Peevyhouses, and it did so by means of the Peevyhouses' own agency
and ability to contract. It is hard to imagine a better example of a
violation of Kant's categorical imperative, whereby we are forbidden to
use people as means to an end and are always to treat them only as
ends in themselves. The coal company not only used the Peevyhouses
as means to an end, but they also used the Peevyhouses' free will and
autonomy, the very things that, according to Kant, make us human.
It is important to distinguish between cases like Peevyhouse
and those in which the breaching party never intended to perform
under the contract. When a party signs a contract with no intent to
perform and does not perform, the breaching party is guilty of fraud,
and such cases are usually considered torts. With the Peeveyhouses,
however, the malfeasance was not a knowing misrepresentation, but
rather a willful refusal to do what one sincerely promised to do. This
refusal is a specifically contractual harm because the only reason the
Peevyhouses were vulnerable to the coal company was because both
sides agreed to the contract. What troubles us about cases like
Peevyhouse is that while it cannot be shown that the coal company
knew at the time of contracting that it would not repair the land, it
appears that circumstances at the time of breach were exactly as they
might have expected, or even hoped, at the time of contracting.
Without punitive damages, cases like Peevyhouse create a formula by
which sophisticated parties can take advantage of unsophisticated
parties by means of strategic breaches in certain kinds of contracts.
This sort of behavior offends our sense of justice, and a corrective-
justice account of contracting would seek to redress such wrongs even
beyond the normal standard of expectation damages.
At this point it might be objected that the real problem with
Peevyhouse is not that expectation damages were insufficient, but
rather that the court applied the wrong measure of expectation
damages. Indeed, Peevyhouse is a casebook chestnut example of the
difference between measuring expectancy by the diminution of market
value versus the measuring it by the cost of completion. 135 Measuring
expectancy by the cost of completion is not unheard of in contract law:
a famous example is Groves v. John Wunder Co., another casebook
standard.1 36 In that case, the court awarded $60,000 to cover the cost
135. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTS 19 (7th ed. 1998).
136. 286 N.W. 235 (Minn. 1939); see, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 135, at 11-18.
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of completion even though the property would have only been worth
$12,160 more after performance.137 The Groves court cited the fact
that the breach was deliberate and willful as a justification for what
arguably was a windfall to the promisee. 138 Most courts have not
followed Groves. and now the general rule is that promisees can only
sue for the cost of completion if such cost is not "greatly out of
proportion" to the diminution in market value. 139 One might argue
that cases like Peevyhouse should be an exception to this rule, thereby
making expectation damages sufficient and punitive damages
unnecessary. But this objection is misplaced because the general rule
for measuring expectation damages by the diminution of market value
if the cost of completion is unreasonably high is the best measure of
expectation damages. In most cases it seems entirely fair and
reasonable not to give the plaintiff the windfall that a
disproportionate cost of completion would provide, especially when "in
none of the cases denying recovery for cost to remedy the defect had
the claimant actually incurred that cost." 140 In a few cases, including
Peevyhouse, expectation damages as measured by the diminution in
market value will not be a satisfactory remedy, but not because the
expected value is worth more. Indeed, while the restoration of the land
might have had a higher subjective value to the Peevyhouses, its
market value was the same. The difference was that they suffered a
normative loss beyond the $300 awarded by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. They were exploited in a way captured neither by the
diminution in the value of their land, nor by the mere declaration by
the court that the coal company had breached.
Another way of seeing this point is to recognize that sometimes
the cost of completion will be much higher than what will be
warranted by the normative loss. While the Peevyhouses were
certainly wronged, a $29,000 damage award (in 1963 dollars) would
almost certainly have overshot the mark. The jury in the trial
apparently agreed since it awarded the Peevyhouses $5,000, an
amount well over the $300 loss in market value but well below the
$29,000 cost of completion. Although overturned on appeal,1 41 the
137. Groves, 286 N.W. at 236.
138. Id. at 238. Importantly, under my view the Groves case would not only not warrant the
cost of completion, but it also would not warrant punitive damages. Although the breach may
have been willful, not all willful breaches warrant punitive damages. Groves involved a contract
between two parties that were both corporations in roughly the same business, which therefore
presumably had relatively equal bargaining power and sophistication. Id. at 236.
139. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 12.13.
140. Id.
141. Peevyhouse, 382 P.2d at 114.
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$5,000 award seems just. It compensates the Peevyhouses for the way
the coal company took advantage of them, without making unrealistic
claims about the value of performance.
One might still object, however, that awarding damages for
normative loss in this way would still be awarding expectation
damages, but instead of measuring the expectancy by cost of
completion or diminution of market value, we would be measuring it
by the subjective value of the performance to the nonbreaching party.
For example, while the Peevyhouses made clear that they wanted
performance, a $5,000 award on top of what they received for the coal
itself might accurately capture their subjective value of the damage
the mining inflicted on their family farm. Thus, such an award is not
punitive, but rather awards expectation damages by another measure.
This is an objection I am prepared to embrace in part.
Expectation damages, unlike reliance damages, do compensate for
normative loss, as explained above. 142 The amount of normative loss is
dictated by the circumstances and by the norms of contracting. When
a promisee places a particularly high value on performance, she will
suffer a correspondingly high normative loss through breach. But
expectation damages should always be measured by the nonbreaching
party's subjective value of performance. Fairness requires that
damages be measured by an objective standard, such as the market
value or a liquidated damages amount stipulated in the contract itself.
A promisee is usually not entitled to claim damages for an amount
above what the market dictates. But in some situations, such as when
an unsophisticated promisee makes a heightened subjective value
clear at the time of contracting, and a sophisticated promisor
nonetheless breaches opportunistically, the promisee should be
entitled to claim a higher value for the failed performance. In these
rare cases, we may still call the higher damage award punitive
because the exploitative wrongdoing of the breaching party justifies
using a different measure for expectation damages. The problem is not
a problem with the normal expectation damages remedy, but rather
with the injustice of settling for that remedy in such egregious cases.
I have been arguing for the somewhat startling conclusion that
a corrective-justice account of contract law would, properly conceived,
sometimes call for punitive damages. As surprising as this conclusion
may be, I have tried to show how slight its departure is from our
common-law tradition. I have done so by arguing that although
American contract law has strict liability and a per se rule against
punitive damages for breach of contract, its normal measure of
142. See supra Part III.
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expectation damages is actually based on the idea of normative loss.
Moreover, the punitive damages for which I argue would not be
available in all cases, or even in all cases of willful breach, but rather
only when a certain kind of normative harm is done. Still, while my
appeal to Kantian norms to distinguish breaches that warrant
punitive damages from normal willful ones does not run counter to
Weinrib's views, others might object that my appeal is too far removed
from our common-law traditions. In the next part, I shall answer this
objection by examining the history of the tort of the bad-faith breach of
contract. While the tort of bad-faith breach is now mostly out of favor
in judicial decisions (unfortunately, in my view), its brief rise suggests
that my arguments are not completely out of touch with the common
law. A cause of action for bad-faith breach of contract is still
recognized in insurance cases. The rationale behind recognizing the
cause of action in those cases coheres with my arguments for punitive
damages and justifies extending their application beyond the context
of insurance.
V. BAD-FAITH BREACH CASES
Although it is currently well established that contract law does
not provide punitive damages, 43 most states now recognize the tort of
bad-faith breach of contract in insurance cases and often award
punitive damages in those cases. 144 In fact, for a short time, California
extended the reach of the bad-faith breach of contract beyond
insurance cases. 145 Only Montana followed California's lead,146 and
both states have since restricted the bad-faith breach of contract tort
to insurance cases. 147 I now turn briefly to examining the reasoning
behind those cases.
The bad-faith tort arose in the 1950s as a cause of action
against insurance companies that refused to accept reasonable
143. "Punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct
constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 355; "[P]enal damages may [not] be had except as specifically
provided in this Act or by other rule of law." U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1991); "Furthermore, a court will
not ordinarily award damages that are described as 'punitive,' intended to punish the party in
breach, or sometimes as 'exemplary,' intended to make an example of that party." FARNSWORTH,
supra note 92, § 12.8. But see Randy L. Sassaman, Note, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions-
Are the Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980) (arguing that courts are
finding more and more ways to circumvent the rule against punitive damages in contract
actions).
144. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 12.8.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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settlement offers in cases where a third party was suing an insured.' 48
The tort is based on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
implicit in all contracts. 149 In the 1970s, the California Supreme Court
extended the tort to first-party cases in which the insurer
unreasonably denied liability to the insured. 150 While most states
followed California and began to recognize such a tort in insurance
cases, in 1984 the California Supreme Court went even further,
suggesting in Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil
Company of California that the bad-faith tort might be extended to
noninsurance contexts so long as a similar "special relationship" was
present. 151 Although the language in Seaman's was dicta, and the
Seaman's court did not specify which relationships besides
insurer/insured would be appropriately special, the California Court of
Appeals soon applied it to the employment and banking contexts. 52
The bad-faith breach tort reached its apex in Montana with a few
cases that allowed such causes of action even absent a special
relationship. 15 3 In the 1990s, however, when no other states had joined
California and Montana in recognizing the bad-faith tort outside the
context of insurance, both states once again restricted the tort to
insurance cases.1 54
Although no states currently recognize the bad-faith breach of
contract tort outside of the insurance context, most continue to
recognize it for insurance cases.1 55 It is worth examining, then, what it
is about the insurance cases that justifies exemplary damages for
breach of contract. Seaman's provides a good starting point.
The Seaman's court made an important distinction between
two kinds of bad-faith breaches. The first category is comprised of
breaching parties who, without any legal justification, deny the very
existence of the contract, thereby seeking to avoid any contract
damages at all.' 56 While the nonbreaching party may be reasonably
expected to anticipate the possibility of a breach, she is still entitled to
expect damages for that breach.15 7 This latter expectation is
vindicated in most insurance cases in which punitive damages are
148. Id.
149. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 205; FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 7.17.
150. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 7.17.
151. 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (1984).
152. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 12.8.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Seaman's, 686 P.2d at 1174.
157. Id.
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awarded. Courts deal harshly with insurance companies that deny
coverage without a good-faith justification in the mere hope that the
insured will not have the will or the resources to take the insurance
company to court. 158
This first category covers most, if not all, cases in which courts
have awarded punitive damages for bad-faith breaches even outside
the insurance context. For example, in Seaman's, the dispute turned
on whether the defendant's denial that the contract met the
requirements of the statute of frauds was in good faith. 159 Similarly, in
Wallis v. Superior Court, an often-cited employer/employee pension
case discussed in more detail below, the court awarded punitive
damages after the defendant told the plaintiff that the pension monies
it had promised to pay him in exchange for his early retirement were
"gratuitous payments" that were "not based on a legal obligation."160
In Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, which
represents "the high-water mark in the history of the bad-faith tort in
California," 161 the court awarded punitive damages against a bank
that had refused to credit a customer's account, citing as its only
defense a statute of limitations that its counsel knew, and later
admitted it had known, to be inapplicable. 162 Even the Montana case
of Nicholson v. United Pacific Insurance Co.,' 63 in which the Montana
Supreme Court extended the breach of the bad-faith tort still further,
involved a bad-faith denial of liability on the part of the breaching
party. 164 In Nicholson, the defendant had contracted with Nicholson
for Nicholson to do construction work. 165 During the course of
Nicholson's performance, the defendant began making unreasonable
demands of Nicholson, accused him of material breach for not meeting
those demands, and then claimed that it was not liable to Nicholson
because of his breach.1 66
Although the cases in which courts have awarded punitive
damages for the breach of the covenant of good faith have been
instances in which the breaching party denied all liability whatsoever,
the Seaman's court identified a second category of breaches that might
158. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, § 12.8.
159. Id. at 1167.
160. 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125 (1984).
161. Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of the Bad
Faith Tort, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 483, 496 (1994).
162. 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 553 (1985).
163. 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont. 1985).
164. Id. at 1348.
165. Id. at 1344.
166. Id.
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warrant the award of punitive damages for bad faith.167 In this second
category, the breaching party is willing to pay expectation damages,
but the damages do not seem to do justice:
This could happen, for example, if at the time of contracting, the parties expressly
indicate their understanding that a breach would be impermissible. Or, it could happen
if it were clear from the inception of the contract that contract damages would be
unavailable or would be inadequate compensation for a breach. 168
The Peeveyhouse case falls into this second category. 169 Although
research reveals no cases in which the courts have found a bad-faith
breach when the breaching party admits liability and is prepared to
pay expectation damages, the reasons that justify awarding punitive
damages for the first kind of bad-faith breach may also justify
awarding them in cases in the second category.
One way to explore whether such reasons actually justify
awarding punitive damages in cases in the second category is to
examine what the California courts thought was important about the
insurer/insured relationship when they were extending the tort to
other relationships. In Wallis v. Superior Court, an employer/employee
pension case, the court identified five characteristics that together
would be sufficient to constitute a special relationship that might give
rise to a bad-faith breach claim:
(1) The contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal bargaining
positions; (2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a nonprofit motivation,
i.e., to secure peace of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordinary contract damages
are not adequate, because (a) they do not require the party in the superior position to
account for its actions, and (b) they do not make the inferior party "whole"; (4) one party
is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may suffer and of necessity places
trust in the other party to perform; and (5) the other party is aware of this
vulnerability. 1 70
These five factors were repeated often in future cases involving bad-
faith breach claims.171 How well do they cohere with the
understanding of contract law as a form of corrective justice under
discussion here?
These five factors cohere with my view of corrective justice in
contract law in three ways. First, the factors help to specify the
content of the norms of private law, in particular the requirements of
fairness. The concern for whether or not the parties occupy an unequal
bargaining position, as well as the concern for the vulnerability of the
nonbreaching party, is not new to contract law, as shown in the short
167. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1174 (Cal. 1984).
168. Id.
169. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
170. 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125-26 (1984).
171. Macintosh, supra note 161, at 495.
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discussion of unconscionability in Part III. While American courts
value freedom of contract and are reluctant to write terms into
contracts or interfere because of inadequate consideration, they may
intervene when the parties are of very unequal sophistication or
bargaining positions, when a contract of adhesion is involved, or when
there is a fiduciary relationship. On the other hand, when parties
bargain at arms' length and both parties are capable of fending for
themselves, courts are much less likely to intervene. Arguably, this
disparate treatment satisfies basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, courts should treat willful breaches
differently in some cases. Those who are not particularly vulnerable,
who are in relatively equal bargaining positions, and who are
contracting to make a profit can be better expected to anticipate what
Holmes thought was obvious, i.e., that parties actually agree to
perform or to pay damages. When their contracting partner breaches
and pays only expectation damages, we do not sense the same
normative loss that is so frustrating to our sense of fairness in the
Peevyhouse case. The first, second, and fourth factors, then, are
consonant with well-settled norms of contract law.
Second, the Wallis court's third characteristic helps to
emphasize that awarding punitive damages to these plaintiffs would
really be a form of corrective and not distributive (or retributive)
justice. Earlier, we saw how, contrary to Fuller and Purdue, Weinrib
and Benson treated expectation damages as truly compensatory and
therefore corrective rather than distributive. 172 I have also argued
that, given Weinrib's distinction between normative and factual loss,
exemplary damages may be compensatory as well. 173 Characteristics
(3)(a) and (3)(b) are reminiscent of Weinrib's distinction between
normative and factual loss and lend themselves to the argument that
exemplary damages in contract law can be compensatory.
Characteristic (3)(b), which states that normal expectation damages
would not make the plaintiff "whole," helps to ensure that the
exemplary damages are not a form of distributive justice, but rather
are still compensatory and corrective. These "punitive" damages are
not essentially concerned with public policy and the manipulation of
human behavior, but rather with the compensation of private parties
for certain egregious wrongs done to them by other private parties.
They are awarded only when the normal measure of damages is not
sufficiently compensatory-or, to hijack language from Weinrib, when
normative losses exceed factual losses such that normal damages will
172. See supra Part III.
173. See supra Parts II & IV.
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not properly compensate. Furthermore, characteristic (3)(a) reminds
us that corrective justice is relational. The amount of compensation is
determined not just by the (factual) loss suffered by the nonbreaching
party, but also by the amount of normative gain by the breaching
party (and the corresponding normative loss by the nonbreaching
party).
Third and finally, characteristics (4) and (5) ensure that
awarding punitive damages based on a bad-faith breach of contract
really is at heart a contractual cause of action, and the norms that
justify punitive damages are related to the Kantian norms already
cited. I realize that here I am perhaps on thin ice. All of the cases that
award punitive damages for breach of contract do so because they
recognize a tort of bad-faith breach of contract. I suspect that this
hesitancy is largely because of inertia: judges are in general
conservative, and it may seem much less radical to recognize a new
tort than to challenge a principle as entrenched as the rule that
contract law does not allow for punitive damages. Even if this is true,
the reasoning behind rules is more important than the labels
themselves. And the reasoning in this case sounds in contract.
We have already seen how contract law has a special concern
for unconscionable contracts. Vulnerability is often a factor in such
considerations. For example, courts will not enforce modifications to a
contract when a first party agrees to them under duress caused by the
second party, especially where it appears that the second party has
exploited that vulnerability. 174 But the insurance context suggests a
further kind of vulnerability. Insurance companies are very often in
an overwhelmingly superior bargaining position to those they insure,
not only at the time of contracting, but especially at the time that a
claim is filed. In addition to the normal advantages that insurance
companies often enjoy due to their size and sophistication, they can
also be in a superior position because once an accident has occurred, it
is too late for an insured person to bargain for different coverage. 175
Purchasing insurance creates a level of dependence and vulnerability
not present in typical contract cases.
What is not mentioned in the typical bad-faith breach tort case
is how parties can be made more vulnerable by the act of contracting
even outside the insurance context. Weinrib has stated that while both
tort and contract are private law, they are distinct in that the rights
and duties in contract law are undertaken voluntarily, while those in
174. FARNSWORTH, supra note 92, §§ 4.21-22.
175. Id. at 503.
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tort generally are not. 176 I have suggested that one of the bases for the
kind of normative loss that could justify an award of exemplary
damages is a violation of Kant's categorical imperative that we treat
people only as ends and never as means. According to Kant, the
capacity of the will to choose freely is what makes us human and is
the source of normativity. When a promisor by contracting places
someone in a particularly vulnerable position and then knowingly and
willfully takes advantage of that vulnerability, he not only treats that
person as an object by failing to respect her moral status as an agent
with free will, but he also uses that very status as a means to an end.
It is one thing to willfully breach a contract and pay damages when
the other party should reasonably expect the possibility and be
prepared to deal with it. But when the promisee makes clear at the
time of contracting that damages would never do, when she only
enters into the contract when reassured of actual performance by the
promisor, and when it is also clear that the promisee makes herself
particularly vulnerable by entering into the contract, it is incumbent
on the promisor to actually perform if at all possible. The failure to do
so might warrant punitive damages in some cases as a means of
compensating the promisee for the normative loss she incurs by being
exploited.
Thus, while punitive damages for bad-faith breaches are now
only awarded in insurance cases, and while they have never been
awarded in the second kind of cases that the Seaman's court imagined,
the justification for awarding such damages in the insurance context
supports their extension to other cases. That justification coheres well
with the norms of contract law and with the goals of corrective justice.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been nearly thirty years since Grant Gilmore and P.S.
Atiyah could confidently claim that contract was dead, subsumed by
tort. Since that time it has become evident that contract law is not
dead or even dying. But its status as private law is indeed in doubt-
as is, ironically, tort law's status. 177 Before we give up on the laws of
tort and contract, however, and completely surrender all of private law
to economics and public policy, we would do well to try to make sense
of private law on its own terms and to elucidate a coherent,
176. See WEINRIB, supra note 2, at 136.
177. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1501 (2002).
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comprehensive private law of tort and contract. Corrective-justice
theories may be the key to this enterprise.
Weinrib has gone a long way toward providing such a theory of
tort law, and in so doing has at least laid the groundwork for a similar
theory of contract. His theory may be the best corrective-justice theory
now available; at the very least, any other theory will have to take his
views into account. But his view comes at a price. We must be willing
to accept a Kantian theory of morality, in particular of the morality of
transactions. We shall also have to be able to make sense of his
distinction between normative and factual losses-a controversial
distinction that this Note has assumed, for the sake of argument, is
intelligible. Finally, we shall have to do more than Weinrib himself
admits: we must be prepared to award punitive damages in
particularly egregious tort cases and even particularly egregious bad-
faith breach of contract cases. To refuse to do so in tort cases is to
return to Coleman's annulment thesis, or at least to stop well short of
Weinrib's persuasive "fully relational" view. Refusing to do so in
contract cases not only stops short of a fully relational view, it also
undermines the reasoning that explains how expectation damages are
compensatory and corrective rather than distributive.
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